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Abstract 
 
Currently a corporation cannot be convicted of manslaughter in New Zealand. Increasingly, 
this distinction demarcated between individuals and corporations seems out of touch, 
particularly in light of legislation passed in cognate jurisdictions and the ascendance of a 
plethora of industrial disasters both in New Zealand and abroad. 
 
Taking as its focus the Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety 
(2013), this paper contemplates the above issues, concluding that the offence’s alignment 
with fundamental criminal law principles makes a strong case for its introduction in New 
Zealand. Consideration is also given to the format and rules of attribution that should 
accompany a resolve to prosecute corporate manslaughter, finding that a more 
comprehensive discussion, going beyond the recommendations of the Taskforce, is necessary 
before any legislation is settled on.  
 
Key Words: corporate manslaughter; workplace health and safety; attribution; corporate 
criminal liability.  
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I Introduction 
 
Recent high profile events have revealed an abject failure in the operation of New Zealand’s 
legal regime for workplace health and safety. In addition to the well-publicised mining 
disaster at Pike River in 2010,1 the collapse of the Christchurch Television building (CTV) 
during the February 2011 earthquake and a recurring spate of fatalities within the forestry 
industry have made the issue of deaths in industry and employment manifest in the public 
consciousness. Concurrently, a discourse has emerged calling for an increased focus on 
higher penalties for what is a perceived culture of negligence among numerous New Zealand 
corporations.  
 
Central in much of the commentary around this issue have been calls for the introduction of 
an offence of corporate manslaughter, a charge that remains curiously absent from our law. 
Organisations such as the New Zealand Council of Trade Unions have argued vehemently for 
the enactment of such charges, in order to more appropriately lay blame for deaths that occur 
in an industrial or corporate context.2 Such a development would bring New Zealand to par 
with several other commonwealth jurisdictions that have embraced the concept of criminal 
liability for deaths at the hands of corporations. The most significant recent development in 
this respect was the United Kingdom, which in 2007 enacted the Corporate Manslaughter and 
Corporate Homicide Act (CMCHA).3  
 
Against this background, the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety was 
convened and published a report in 2013 assessing the efficacy and suitability of our current 
legal mechanisms in this area.4 In the course of the widespread review it conducted regarding 
industrial health and safety, it sought in part to track the development of offences of 
corporate manslaughter in other jurisdictions and assess the potentiality of replicating these 
laws in New Zealand. The Taskforce’s key recommendations for addressing offending were 
the strengthening of occupational health and safety laws and the extension of the existing law 
                                               
1  See generally Rebecca Macfie Tragedy at Pike River Mine – how and why 29 men died (Awa Press, 
Wellington, 2013).  
2 New Zealand Council of Trade Unions “Submission to the Transport and Industrial Relations Committee on 
the Health and Safety Reform Bill 2014” at [S.93]. See also Sarah-Lee Stead and Nura Taefi “Should New 
Zealand introduce corporate manslaughter?” ISN Magazine (New Zealand, July 2012) at 22.  
3 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007 (UK). 
4  Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety The Report of the Independent Taskforce on 
Workplace Health and Safety (April 2013). 
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of manslaughter to corporations.5 Whilst the first of these objectives is on the path to being 
addressed through the Health and Safety Reform Bill 2014,6 recent remarks by the Prime 
Minister appear to have put the issue of corporate manslaughter to rest once again.7   
 
The aims of this paper are twofold. Part III aims to consider afresh the case for corporate 
manslaughter in contemporary New Zealand, concluding that the offence’s consistency with 
the principles of deterrence and denunciation in the criminal law and the persistence of 
industrial related harms warrants criminal sanction in the form of a manslaughter charge. Part 
IV will examine with a critical eye the conclusions of the Taskforce, pondering how to 
structure and conceptualise any eventual offence of corporate manslaughter so as to achieve a 
more robust and safe industrial culture. 
 
II Corporate Criminal Liability 
 
The position has now been reached that a person, for the purposes of the criminal law, may 
include both natural and artificial persons.8 The common law was historically hesitant to 
recognize the notion of a corporate body having a conscience sufficiently autonomous to 
warrant criminal punishment and, as Baron Edward Thurlow notably stated in 1844, the 
traditional thinking was that such bodies had “no soul to be damned, and no body to be 
kicked.”9 The earliest rationalisations of a doctrine of corporate criminal liability were made 
on the basis of agency, where “acts had to be performed not by the corporation, but in its 
name.”10 Vicarious liability provided one method by which the corporate body could be 
penalized, however, it was of limited use in that it could not apply to mens rea offences. The 
1944 case of DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors, the first in a line of cases elucidating the 
modern position, came to the conclusion that a corporation could possess guilty knowledge 
and form an intention to perform a criminal act.11 There now exists a rebuttable presumption 
                                               
5 Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, above n 4, at [386]. 
6 Health and Safety Reform Bill 2014 (192-1). 
7 Patrice Dougan “PM: Corporate manslaughter law ‘unlikely’” The New Zealand Herald (New Zealand, 3 
December 2013). 
8 Interpretation Act 1999, s 30: “person includes a corporation sole, and also a body of persons, whether 
corporate or unincorporate.” See also, Crimes Act 1961, s 2: “person… include[s]… any… company, and any 
other body of persons, whether incorporated or not.” 
9 Quoted in Amanda Pinto and Martin Evans Corporate Criminal Liability (3rd ed, Sweet and Maxwell, London, 
2003) at 15.  
10 LH Leigh The Criminal Liability of Corporations in English Law (Widenfield and Nicolson, London, 1969) at 
5. 
11 DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd [1944] KB 146; [1944] 1 All ER 119 at 155. 
 6 
that criminal offences apply directly, not vicariously, to corporate bodies, unless the language 
of the relevant offence suggests otherwise.12 Certain offences, such as perjury, bigamy13 and 
the subject of this paper, homicide, have been ruled as inapplicable to a corporation as, by 
their very nature, they necessitate the actions of a singular, natural person. 
 
In seeking to provide a principled basis for attributing blame to the corporate body, Andrew 
Ashworth writes that the trend in the development of corporate liability rules “has been to 
attempt to fit corporate liability into the existing structure rather than to consider its 
implications afresh.” 14  Although the criminal law was engineered overwhelmingly to 
ascertain the liability of individuals, a de novo, first principles approach to the implications of 
corporate liability has not taken place. It is this confused basis on which the principles of 
corporate liability lie that informs much of the debate as to its future. 
 
A The ‘identification’ doctrine 
 
The settled norm in the imputation of criminal liability to corporations is the identification 
doctrine, which requires that a single individual, acting as a “directing mind and will,” as 
distinct from the “hands” of the company in the wider workforce, is identified as having 
performed the requisite elements of the offence.15 The House of Lords in Tesco Supermarkets 
Ltd v Nattrass, the authoritative ruling on this issue, articulated the following central 
principle: 16 
 
“[T]he person who acts is not speaking or acting for the company. He is acting as 
the company and his mind which directs his acts is the mind of the company. 
There is no question of the company being vicariously liable. He is not acting as a 
servant, representative, agent or delegate. He is an embodiment of the company 
or, one could say, he hears and speaks through the persona of the company, 
within his appropriate sphere, and his mind is the mind of the company.” 
 
                                               
12 AP Simester and WJ Brookbanks Principles of Criminal Law (4th ed, Brookers, Wellington, 2012) at 220. 
13 R v ICR Haulage Ltd [1944] 1 KB 551, 1 All ER 691 (CA) at 554 and 693. 
14 Andrew Ashworth and Jeremy Hodder Principles of Criminal Law (7th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2013) at 147. 
15 Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1915] A.C. 705 (HL) at 713. 
16 Tesco Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153, [1971] 2 All ER 127 (HL) at 170. 
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This individual must have personally committed the crime in question in order for liability to 
be attributed to the company. 
 
It has long been considered that the identification process yields unsatisfactory results, with 
Celia Wells writing that the model’s “concentration on the misdeeds of managerial officers 
ignores the reality of corporate decision making.” 17  Indeed, in all but the smallest of 
companies, layers of authority serve to divorce the senior management from the day-to-day 
workings of the organisation, rendering the task of identifying such an individual virtually 
impossible. Arising out of these concerns, a model of ‘aggregation’ has been suggested to 
remedy the shortfalls of this focus on the location of a culpable individual officer. Such a 
system would introduce liability where two or more officers perform acts or omissions that, if 
carried out by one of them, would ordinarily lead to the personal liability of that officer. The 
conduct of this totality of individuals is aggregated to attach to the corporate body itself. 
However, common law courts have given strong indication that they do not consider it 
appropriate to alter the basis of liability in this way, such as in Attorney General’s Reference 
(No 2 of 1999) where the identification doctrine was affirmed as the established and correct 
principle.18  
Notably, the judgment of Lord Hoffmann in Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v 
Securities Commission put forward a substantially more ad hoc method of attribution, 
grounded in statutory interpretation. Lord Hoffmann was of the view that:19 
“[T]he Court must fashion a special rule of attribution for the particular 
substantive rule. This is always a matter of interpretation: given that it was 
intended to apply to a company, how was it intended to apply? Whose act (or 
knowledge, or state of mind) was for this purpose intended to count as the act 
etc of the company? One finds the answer to this question by applying the usual 
canons of interpretation, taking into account the language of the rule (if it is a 
statute) and its content and policy.” 
 
Such an approach found favour with the New Zealand Court of Appeal in Linework Ltd v 
Department of Labour, 20 but it is also the case that the orthodox identification doctrine 
                                               
17 Celia Wells, Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993) at 132. 
18 Attorney-General’s Reference (No. 2 of 1999) [2000] 2 Cr App R 207 at 218 per Rose LJ. 
19 Meridian Global Funds Management Asia Ltd v Securities Commission [1995] 3 NZLR 7 (PC) at 12-13. 
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maintains a strong hold in spite of Lord Hoffmann’s seemingly transformative ruling.21 While 
Lord Hoffmann’s test might appear to be at odds with identification principles, scholars are 
of the view that the Meridian approach does not purport to overturn the traditional doctrine, 
but supplements it with a “principle of allegiance to the purpose of the statute” where the 
circumstances require.22 The default rules continue to be based on the location of a “directing 
mind and will.”23 
 
B Corporate manslaughter: the ‘current position’ 
 
1 New Zealand 
 
A corporation may not be convicted of manslaughter in New Zealand. Whilst a person is 
designated in the Crimes Act as referring to both natural and legal persons,24 the language of 
section 158 limits the ambit of a potential charge of homicide to the “killing of a human 
being by another.”25 The verdict reached in R v Murray Wright Ltd unequivocally confirmed 
that the ‘human being requirement’ prevents a company from being liable, as a principal, for 
homicide.26 At a minimum, this element of section 158 would require amendment to the term 
person in order for a manslaughter charge to be brought against a corporation. However, this 
does not deny the ability of a corporate body to be liable as a secondary party to a homicide 
committed by an individual.27 The relevant Crimes Act provision governing the ambit of 
secondary participation, section 66, does not contain the same language of a “human 
being.”28 
 
2 United Kingdom 
 
(i) Common law: 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
20 Linework Ltd v Department of Labour [2001] 2 NZLR 639 (CA) at [12]. 
21 St Regis Paper Company Ltd v R [2011] EWCA Crim 2527 at [12].  
22 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 12, at 228. 
23 Ibid. 
24 Crimes Act 1961, s 2. 
25 Crimes Act 1961, s 158. 
26 R v Murray Wright Ltd [1970] NZLR 476 (CA) at 480. 
27 Simester and Brookbanks, above n 12, at 221. 
28 Crimes Act 1961, s 66. 
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Prior to the introduction of its present statutory instrument, the common law of the United 
Kingdom had warmed to the idea of extending the application of the offence of manslaughter 
to corporate bodies. Although accounts differ as to the exact genesis of the principle, the 
unreported 1965 case of R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd is often touted as the 
earliest indication of an assent to prosecuting corporate manslaughter at common law.29 In 
any event, by 1969 scholars accepted that “it now seems clear that corporations may be liable 
for manslaughter.”30 However, conviction for the common law offence of manslaughter by 
gross negligence was still dependent on attributing liability under the identification doctrine, 
a hurdle that bred a very limited number of successful prosecutions.31 One salient example, 
the capsizing of the Herald of Free Enterprises ferry in 1987, caused the death of nearly 200 
passengers resulting from the failure of members of three employees of mixed seniority to 
close and check the ship’s bow doors.32 A Judicial Inquiry into the disaster led Sheen J to 
reach the damning verdict that “from top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the 
disease of sloppiness.”33 However, Bingham L.J., reiterating the identification doctrine, ruled 
that manslaughter could not be proved. 34  The resulting legislation, the CMCHA, was 
intended as a corrective to the dire state of affairs in which such tragedies went without 
penalty. 
 
(ii) Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007: 
 
The product of repeated calls for reform dating back to 1996, 35  the CMCHA served to 
introduce an offence distinct from the common law of manslaughter, grounded primarily in 
the law of negligence. The new offence, contained in Section 1 of the Act, provides that an 
organisation will be guilty if it causes a person’s death in circumstances of a gross breach of a 
duty of care to which the defendant company owed the victim.36 Additionally, the way in 
which in which the company’s activities are managed or organised by its senior management 
                                               
29 R v Northern Strip Mining Construction Co Ltd (The Times 2, 4, 5 February 1965). Cited in Gary Slapper 
“Corporate manslaughter: An examination of the determinants of prosecutorial policy” (1993) 2 Social and legal 
Studies 423 at 424. 
30 LH Leigh, above n 10, at 59. 
31 Andrea Oates Tolley’s Corporate Manslaughter and Homicide: A guide to compliance (Lexis Nexis, London, 
2008) at 7. 
32 Pinto and Evans, above n 9, at 220.  
33 Report of Sheen J “MV Herald of Free Enterprise report of Court no. 8074 Formal Investigation” (Ministry of 
Transport (UK), London, 1987) at 14. 
34 P&O Ferries (Dover) Ltd (The Herald of Free Enterprise Case) [1990] 93 Cr App R 72 at 84. 
35 See Generally Law Commission (UK) Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (Law Com 
237, 1996).  
36 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, s 1. 
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must form a substantial element of the breach.37 Such has been termed a ‘managerial fault’ 
model; its intent being that “liability for the new offence depends on a finding of gross 
negligence in the way in which the activities of the organization are run.”38 A finding of these 
elements creates prima facie liability under the Act to an unlimited fine, a remedial and/or a 
publicity order, provided that the defendant cannot establish one of the Act’s many 
exceptions.39 This development was welcomed among legal academics, and the ‘managerial 
fault’ approach to liability has been heralded as “breaking new conceptual ground.”40 The 
question of whether this legislation has truly been apt in prosecuting divergent behaviour will 
be considered at a later point in the essay.41 
 
III The Case for Corporate Manslaughter  
 
A Principles and policies of the criminal law 
 
Many of the fundamental principles of the criminal law would arguably be well served by the 
introduction of a charge of corporate manslaughter. Principally, conviction for an offence of 
manslaughter, as opposed to a prosecution for breach of a health and safety offence would 
more adequately reflect the community outrage that is evident in the burgeoning calls for 
stricter penalties for corporate offending. Widespread dissatisfaction with the outcome of 
attempts to hold companies and the individuals within them to account, including the refrain 
from prosecuting Pike River manager Peter Whittall, 42 has only served to exacerbate this 
sense of disillusionment with the potency of our current legal armoury. Such public disquiet 
provides cause for considering the “fair labelling” principle of the criminal law, which holds 
that offences should be “subdivided and labelled so as to represent fairly the nature and 
magnitude of law-breaking.”43 This principle is not merely to satiate public outrage but exists 
                                               
37 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, s 1(3). 
38  Ministry of Justice (UK) “A guide to the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act 2007, 
Explanatory Notes” (Minsitry of Justice, United Kingdom 2007) at [14].  
39 CMCHA, ss 3(1) – 7(1); Exceptions to the CMCHA include public policy decisions, and instances in relation 
to military activities, the Police and Emergency Services. 
40 AP Simester and GR Sullivan Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (4th ed, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2010) at 
282. 
41 See part IV C 1. 
42 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment “Charges against Peter Whittall not proceeding” (press 
release, 12 December 2013). See also Rebecca Macfie, above n 1, at 248. 
43 Ashworth, above n 14, at 77. 
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for reasons of legal principle, arguing, “where people reasonably regard two types of conduct 
as different, the law should try to reflect that difference.”44  
 
The criminal stature of a manslaughter charge arguably becomes more desirable in the 
context of our current regime for the correction of health and safety malfeasance, the Health 
and Safety in Employment Act 1992.45 Breaches of this legislation are considered ‘regulatory 
offences’ which, although carrying penalty, fall victim to a perceived “‘real’ crime-‘quasi’ 
crime distinction.”46 Manslaughter, a serious ‘true crime’ offence, would provide a greater 
avenue for expressing public censure and condemnation. Whether or not such a distinction is 
valid, there is something to be said for classifying corporate behaviour causing death as 
manslaughter in order to more adequately reflect its seriousness, rather than falling under the 
‘regulatory’ sphere of the criminal law. 
 
Intuitively, the ‘stigma’ and detrimental public image accompanying a manslaughter charge, 
in conjunction with higher penalties, would work to satisfy the ‘deterrence’ aims of the 
criminal law. However, one compelling argument weighing against this appearance of 
harmony with fundamental principles is a concern that a corporate manslaughter charge 
might merely create a semblance of stricter penalties whilst the bulk of deterrence is realised 
by the health and safety compliance regime. In effect, it would be tantamount to a hollow 
attempt at “penal populism.”47 Such a criticism would seem to have greater gravity in light of 
the impending passage of the Health and Safety Reform Bill in which, it is hoped, a more 
effective compliance and penalty regime will be established.  
 
It is the author’s view that the justification for corporate manslaughter remains in spite of this 
development. The new offences contained in the Bill before the House will not penalise 
deaths but merely the exposure to the risk of death.48 While there would undoubtedly be a 
degree of overlap between the behaviour examined under both categories of offences, the 
                                               
44 Ashworth, above n 14, at 77. 
45 Health and Safety in Employment Act 1992, ss 49-56. 
46 Wells, above n 17, at 8. 
47 See generally John Pratt and Marie Clark “Penal Populism in New Zealand” (2005) 7 Punishment and Society 
303. 
48 Proposed offences under the Health and Safety Reform Bill include reckless conduct in respect of health and 
safety duty (s 42), failing to comply with a health and safety duty that exposes and individual to the risk of death 
or serious injury or illness (s 43) and failing to comply with a health and safety duty (s 44).  
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focus remains on different harms and outcomes. The justification for a corporate 
manslaughter indictment, if only for symbolic reasons, remains intact.  
 
In any event, submissions made during the legislative passage of the Bill indicate a view in 
some quarters that the introduction of corporate manslaughter is still necessary, with the 
Council of Trade Unions criticising the Bill for not going far enough in its punishment of 
negligent organisations.49 The lack of sanction currently available to address the dangerous 
behaviour found in recent years reflects how patent the need for an offence of this nature is. 
 
B New Zealand: a commonwealth anomaly 
 
New Zealand’s lack of an offence of corporate manslaughter puts it at odds with 
developments in many of the jurisdictions to which our legal system is attentive, particularly 
in light of the CMCHA. In addition, New Zealand remains firmly grounded in the common 
law doctrine of identification, where many other commonwealth jurisdictions have sought 
statutory reform of these rules, whether pertaining to a specific manslaughter offence or rules 
of general application in the criminal law. Notably, Canada amended its corporate liability 
rules in 2003, and although not equipped with a charge of corporate manslaughter, they have 
attempted to make prosecutions against corporations easier concerning their offence of 
causing death by criminal negligence.50 Australia similarly sought to change the generic rules 
of corporate liability at a federal level, albeit in a different manner51 and, although other 
states have not followed its lead, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) enacted an offence 
of Industrial Manslaughter in 2003 where an employer or senior officer causes the death of a 
worker in the course of employment.52  
 
Notwithstanding the question of whether or not these offences are in fact effective, New 
Zealand comparatively appears behind in its treatment of industrial and workplace related 
fatalities. 
 
                                               
49New Zealand Council of Trade Unions, above n 2. See also Radio New Zealand “Safety reforms don't go far 
enough, MPs told” (2014) <www.radionz.co.nz>.  
50 Criminal Code RSC 1985 c C-46, ss 22.1-22.2. See part IV A for a fuller discussion of Canada’s corporate 
liability rules. 
51 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Aus), Criminal Code, Part 2.5, ss 12.1-12.6. See part V for fuller discussion. 
52 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT), ss 49D-49E. 
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IV The Report of the Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety 
 
The Taskforce was established in June 2012, with a view to undertaking a “strategic review 
of whether the New Zealand workplace health and safety system remains fit for purpose” on 
the occasion of the 20 year anniversary of the Health and Safety in Employment Act 1982.53 
The report of the Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, released that 
September, had already taken the view that consideration should be given, among a full 
spectrum of health and safety reform proposals, to the introduction of an offence of corporate 
manslaughter, a call to which the Taskforce took heed.54 The resultant report undertook to 
examine the current state of the law internationally as regards corporate manslaughter, as 
well as setting out their view of the approach New Zealand should take. It provides perhaps 
the most holistic and comprehensive survey of issues pertaining to health and safety law in 
New Zealand. Accordingly, the recommendations made by the Taskforce would likely be 
salient to any concrete proposals for reform, should they arise in the future. Scrutiny of the 
Taskforce’s findings in respect of corporate manslaughter is thus valid and important. 
 
The principal argument made within the report was that changes in the common law rules of 
the attribution of corporate criminal liability, applicable to all offences, was the issue of 
primary importance for New Zealand and that, from these changes, the extension of the 
general law of manslaughter to corporations would become feasible. Changes to the rules of 
attribution were said to rest on two key issues: (i) Allowing the attribution of criminal 
liability to a corporation as a result of the acts and omissions of a greater range of officers 
and employees, and (ii), the introduction of a system of aggregated criminal liability for the 
acts and omissions of two or more officers.55  
 
A Liability for the acts and omissions of a greater range of officers 
 
The Taskforce directed strong criticism at the identification doctrine of attribution, 
particularly in its requirement that the offending individual be a “directing mind and will” of 
the corporate body. This was cited as the predominant reason why criminal prosecutions 
                                               
53 Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety “Terms of Reference for the Independent Taskforce 
undertaking the Strategic Review of the Workplace Health and Safety System” (2012) <hstaskforce.govt.nz>. 
54 Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy Report of the Royal Commission on the Pike River 
Coal Mine Tragedy, Volume 2 (2012) at 310. 
55 Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, above n 4, at [382]. 
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against corporations, in New Zealand and beyond, were seen as unlikely to succeed. In order 
to remedy this shortcoming, the Taskforce considered that, provided the individuals 
concerned were acting within the scope of their authority, corporate criminal liability should 
extend to the acts and omissions of a “greater range of officers.”56   
 
It is, of course, hard to determine what degree of extension was meant by the phrase ‘greater 
range of officers,’ as the Taskforce did not see it necessary to expand on their conclusions. 
However, the Taskforce did refer with apparent approval to the terminology adopted in the 
Canadian Criminal Code as one way to structure corporate liability rules so as to relax the 
stringent requirements of the identification doctrine. 57  As a result of their familiar 
dissatisfaction with the workings of the existing rules of attribution, statutory reform took 
place in Canada in 2003 through the passing of Bill “C-45.” Of note within such reforms was 
the use of the term “senior officer,” who play a central role in the attribution of liability to 
corporations for offences of negligence. Such officers are defined within the Code as a 
“representative who plays an important role in the establishment of an organisation’s policies 
or is responsible for managing an important aspect of the organisation’s activities and, in the 
case of a body corporate, includes a director, its chief executive officer and its chief financial 
officer.”58  Although these officers would appear to refer to the similar narrow class of 
individuals considered a “directing mind and will” under the previous doctrine, explanations 
of the Bill by the Canadian Department of Justice maintain that the Code’s focus is “on the 
function of the individual, not any particular title.”59  
 
Although case law concerning these adaptions to the Code is limited, the recent judgment in 
R v Metron Construction Corp. gives promising signals that the Courts have interpreted the 
concept of a ‘senior officer’ as widening the basis of attributing liability away from a small 
cache of upper level management. 60  In that case, three employees of the defendant 
construction company fell to their deaths from a swing stage platform while working to 
restore a high-rise building. The platform was not properly constructed and collapsed under 
the weight of six men in gross excess of the platform’s weight capacity. The site supervisor, 
Mr Fazilov, permitted this overabundance of workers on the platform, with the additional 
                                               
56 Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, above n 4, at [382]. 
57 Ibid, at [381]. 
58 Criminal Code 1985 (Canada), above n 50, s 2.  
59 Department of Justice (Canada) “Criminal Liability of Organizations – a plain language guide to Bill C-45” 
(2003) <www.justice.gc.ca> at 5. 
60 R v Metron Construction Corp [2012] 1 CCEL (4th) 266. 
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knowledge that they were under the influence of drugs at the time. At trial, Justice Bigelow 
saw no reason why Fazilov could not be classed as a senior officer and expressed that “these 
changes in the criminal law…clearly extends the attribution of… corporate criminal liability 
to the actions of mid-level managers.”61 
 
Section 22.1 of the Code, which establishes the Canadian approach to liability for crimes of 
negligence, also differs critically from the identification doctrine in that these senior officers 
need not have personally committed the offence, but must exhibit a marked departure from 
the standard of care that, in the circumstances, could reasonably be expected to prevent any 
representative of the organisation from being a party to the offence.62 In essence, senior 
officers owe a duty not to allow, through want of care, other representatives to commit the 
unlawful acts or omissions. Says Colvin, “the focus on senior personnel has moved away 
from their own conduct and onto the quality of their supervision of other persons.”63 Where 
the traditional identification doctrine would require this officer to be personally guilty, the 
Code would allow liability where any representative or representatives64 commit the offence, 
provided they were unsupervised to a marked degree by a relevant senior officer.  
 
It can be gleaned from the amendments made to the Code that the location of a senior officer 
was to be based on authority in real terms, rather than a limitation to a specific class of 
officers with titles of formal seniority.65 It may well be that this facet of the Code imports 
some of the problems that have been levelled at the approach taken by Lord Hoffmann in 
Meridian. Such an approach would allow the judge to make an assessment of whether the 
offending actor was intended, due to the policy and language of the offence, as a relevant 
directing mind for attribution of liability to the company, seemingly avoiding a fixed 
determination of a certain class of management for attribution. Indeed, one of the pertinent 
considerations when assessing liability on the basis of the Meridian approach is whether the 
individual concerned had practical or effective authority.66 Similarly, section 22.1 merely 
requires that the senior officer play a significant role in policy and or management. Criticism 
of the particular approach taken by Lord Hoffmann has been forthcoming by academic 
                                               
61 R v Metron Construction Corp, above n 60, at [15]. 
62 Criminal Code 1985 (Canada), above n 50, s 22.1. A ‘representative’ is defined in s 2 of the Code as a 
“director, partner, employee, member, agent or contractor of the organization.”   
63 Eric Colvin and Sanjeev Anand Principles Of Criminal Law (3rd ed, Thomson, Toronto 2007) at 126. 
64 The Code also allows for a system of aggregated liability: ss 22.1(a)(ii). 
65 Department of Justice (Canada), above n 59, at 5. 
66 Linework Ltd v Department of Labour, above n 20, at [12]. 
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writers, mostly for reasons of the apparent inconsistencies such an approach might result in, 
with the “greater uncertainty regarding who will be deemed the relevant person within the 
corporate hierarchy … likely to lead to difficulties.”67 This is particularly true for corporations, 
which require clarity from judicial rulings in order to create policies that can provide a 
meaningful method to ensure compliance with the law.  
 
By way of comparison, the CMCHA’s “senior management” test could be said to mirror the 
language of “senior officer” present in the Canadian Code. 68  In a similar vein to the 
interpretation of senior officer in the Code, “senior management” is defined within the Act as 
the persons who play a significant role in:69 
 
(i) the making of decisions about how the whole or a substantial part of its 
activities are to be managed or organised, or; 
(ii) the actual managing or organising of the whole or a substantial part of those 
activities. 
 
The inclusion of persons tasked with actual management or organisation might reflect the 
Canadian interpretation of persons wielding actual authority, potentially giving scope for the 
courts to look below a director and executive level in interpreting ‘senior management’ to 
officers more aligned with the “hands” of the corporation. But, as will be made clear at a 
further point in this paper, a body of case law has not developed in the United Kingdom 
surrounding this offence so as to test this hypothesis.70 
 
The CMCHA could comparatively be said to suffer from a lack of clarity as to the conduct 
that will be required to bring a corporations’ senior management, however interpreted, within 
the purview of the Act. Section 22.1 of the Code establishes that, at a minimum, senior 
officers must have been grossly negligent in failing to prevent other representatives from 
committing the offence. By contract, the CMCHA states only that the way in which these 
persons manage the organisation’s activities should play a substantial role in the breach of 
duty owed.   
 
                                               
67  Meaghan Wilkinson “Corporate Criminal Liability. The Move Towards Recognising Genuine Corporate 
Fault” (2003) 9 Canta LR 142 at 151. 
68 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, s 1(3). 
69 s 1(4)(c). 
70 See Part IV C 1. 
 17 
Additionally, there currently exists a lack of elucidation as to what a substantial role will 
even entail. Early perceptions of the legislation were of the view that substantial was to mean 
“more than trivial,” and in so doing meant that senior managers would not have to be solely 
responsible for the breach of duty. 71 It is submitted that, with respect, this is a strained 
interpretation of the provision, as any plain reading of the language of a substantial element 
would suggest that a high threshold of conduct is required.  
 
Perhaps symptomatic of the lack of time in which coherent legal principles have been able to 
develop, the law appears to be at a loss as to an effective way to capture corporate liability in 
terms of the true nature of the bodies’ activities. The emphasis on officers at a senior level of 
management likely reflects the justified apprehension that, in fixing the threshold of officers 
too low, bottom-rung employees, who by and large do not perform meaningful work and are 
not influential enough to truly embody the company, will be able to be identified as 
satisfactory to pin liability for serious offences to the corporation aggregate. However, in so 
doing, these models may replicate the same focus on individuals that were the immediate 
cause for their reform.  
 
B Aggregation  
 
The Taskforce was of the view that changes in the general rules of corporate liability would 
“need to provide that liability could be attributed to a corporation if two or more individuals 
of the required seniority within the company engaged in conduct that, if it had been   the 
conduct of only one of them, would have made them personally liable for the offence.”72 It is 
beyond doubt that this would require statutory enactment, as the common law has not felt 
able to so radically alter the basis of liability.73 
Changing the basis of corporate liability in this way would harmonise New Zealand practice 
with a vast swathe of academic commentary in support of aggregation. Writes Celia Wells, 
“it is necessary to move away from the idea, implicit in both the vicarious and alter ego 
principles, that a corporation can only be liable through the unlawful activities of one 
particular officer or worker.” 74  Influenced by this academic appraisal, the concept of 
                                               
71 Oates, above n 31, at 142. 
72 Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, above n 4, at [382]. 
73 Attorney General’s Reference No. 2 of 1999, above n 18, at 218 per Rose LJ. 
74 Wells, above n 17, at 132. 
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aggregation has also formed an integral role in cognate corporate liability laws. Section 22.1 
of the Canadian Code provides that an organization is party to an offence of negligence 
“if…two or more of its representatives engaged in conduct…such that, if it had been the 
conduct of only one representative, that representative would have been a party to the 
offence.”75 Additionally, the CMCHA would appear to provide for aggregation in that the 
‘senior management’ who must play a substantial role in the breach refers to the persons who 
play significant managerial roles, rather than the location of a singular officer.76  
 
The pronouncements made by the Taskforce, although in support of the principle of 
aggregation, contain key differences to the approaches taken internationally. Where the 
Taskforce’s reasoning would aggregate liability where two officers of the required seniority 
commit the required acts, the Canadian Code stipulates that two or more representatives, 
rather than the analogous senior officers, can be aggregated to constitute a liable organisation. 
The Taskforce’s reasoning thus appears to be still grounded in concerns with a limited upper 
class of management, rather than taking an expansive view of corporate culpability as 
capable of stemming from a variety of levels of the corporate structure. Arguably, it is the 
“hands” of the corporation that are most likely to commit the acts catalysing a homicide. 
In spite of the growing attention given to models of aggregation, the theoretical 
underpinnings of the concept are not unanimously championed among academics. Some 
consider it “not possible to artificially construct the mens rea in this way,” being of the view 
that “two semi innocent states of mind cannot be added together to produce a guilty state of 
mind.”77  
A common justification for a system of aggregation is that the model captures instances of a 
“widespread pattern of negligence by its individual representatives [that] may amount to a 
more serious breach of its own duty of care.”78  However, the author is of the view that it 
would be wrong to presuppose that an aggregated system will deal wholly with widespread 
patterns among a large number of employees. The model, by its very description, would draw 
liability from the conduct of as few as two employees. While aggregation would adequately 
catch cases of widespread malfeasance where it can be said that all layers of the organization 
                                               
75 Criminal Code (Canada), above n 50, s 22.1. 
76 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, s 1(3). 
77 David Ormerod Smith and Hogan’s Criminal Law (13th ed, Oxford University Press, New York, 2011) at 
[10.1.2.5]. 
78 Colvin and Anand, above n 63, at 127. 
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played a role in the offences committed, it may also impose liability in the situation where 
two wayward employees, subject to a lack of supervision, commit the relevant offence. It is 
doubtful whether this is conduct that we would instinctively liken to an organisation plagued 
by the “disease of sloppiness.” 
 
It is submitted that, for these reasons, aggregation should not provide the fulcrum of any 
method of attributing criminal liability to a corporation. While a useful tool, it should be 
coupled with an assessment of the corporate body as a whole, so as to mitigate the risk of 
apportioning blame at companies when only a small number of representatives were privy to 
the offence.  
 
C No separate offence of corporate manslaughter 
 
Going against the grain of the reforms enacted in the United Kingdom and other 
commonwealth jurisdictions, the view of the Taskforce was that reform should come via the 
extension of the general law of manslaughter to corporations. Thus, while they were 
enthusiastic about a charge of some nature becoming part of our law, the Taskforce did not 
support the introduction of a separate statutory offence of corporate manslaughter, as has 
been the recent trend. This was justified primarily on the basis of the Taskforce’s 
characterisation of the comparative offences in the United Kingdom and Canada as being of 
limited efficacy. The Taskforce concluded that the low rate of successful prosecutions of 
corporations for manslaughter was indicative of the hold of existing corporate liability rules, 
which “make it very difficult to convict a corporation for core Crimes Act offences.”79   
 
Further justification against an isolated change to the law of manslaughter was made on the 
basis for a potential legal anomaly, whereby the particular offence of corporate manslaughter 
would be adrift from the orthodox principles informing the criminal liability of corporations 
generally. If recourse was made to a separate offence, framed to relieve the difficulties of 
establishing liability using the identification doctrine, the Taskforce rightly indicates that it 
“would end up making it easier to convict a corporation of manslaughter than of some other 
offence against a person”80  In principle, the means of attributing corporate liability should 
apply consistently to any offence that a corporation could conceivably commit. The specific 
                                               
79 Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, above n 4, at [379]. 
80 Ibid, at [380]. 
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harm of killing does not of itself warrant a distinct lower threshold of liability, and offences 
such as Injuring by Unlawful Act should also be relieved from the strictness of the 
identification doctrine.81 The Taskforce’s view was that changes at a general level to the rules 
of attribution were preferable for the coherent development of the law.  
 
1 Is the CMCHA 2007 an effective means of attributing liability? 
 
The Taskforce placed strong emphasis on what it considered to be a failure in the operation 
of the 2007 legislation. Indicative of this failure was, in the Taskforce’s view, a low rate of 
prosecutions brought under the Act, of which “all…were against small companies.”82 As a 
result, they were of the opinion that a model such as that developed in the United Kingdom 
should not be followed.83 The emergent case law surrounding the offence, or lack thereof, to 
some extent supports this conclusion. The first successful indictment brought under the 
Section 1 offence, R v Costswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd, concerned the death of a 
geologist resulting from the collapse of an unsupported pit. The defendant was a small 
company in which the sole director, Mr Eaton, was easily classifiable as senior 
management.84 There was, as a result, no question that Eaton had played a substantial role in 
the company’s breach of duty and it seems likely that the director would have been identified 
as a “directing mind.” Further charges were instigated against JMW Farm Ltd and Lion Steel 
Ltd, the latter of which was a company of larger size, however both pleaded guilty, thus 
avoiding the need to proceed to trial.85 But the Taskforce’s analysis of these cases as few and 
far between served to mischaracterize the operation of the Act as a failure, where it is instead 
merely the case that a body of law surrounding the offence simply has not had the 
opportunity to develop.86 This does not necessarily mean that the offence is ineffective.  
 
Of critical importance to, and currently absent from, any analysis of the CMCHA is an 
exposition regarding how the mechanics of the offence will work in the courts. Issues such as 
how the judge will summarise a ‘gross’ breach in the context of corporate, rather than 
individual offending, and how the senior management test will unfold are the characteristics 
                                               
81 Crimes Act 1961, s 190. 
82 Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety, above n 4, at [374]. 
83 Ibid, at [376]. 
84 R v Cotswold Geotechnical Holdings Ltd 2011 WL 2649504 at 3. 
85  Jonathon Grimes “Corporate Manslaughter” The Law Society Gazette (London, 29 August 2012) 
<www.lawgazette.co.uk>.  
86 As at 21 August 2014 there have been six convictions for corporate manslaughter. 
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that make the offence unique and thus provide the salient points in any discussion of whether 
we should adopt it.  
 
As New Zealand has the benefit of time, with no proposals for corporate manslaughter at any 
substantive stage in the legislative process, we would do well to assess the continuing 
prosecutions under the Act as they come to light. The Taskforce was premature in reaching a 
conclusion that the statutory approach of the United Kingdom was wholly inappropriate as a 
method of reform.  
 
V Prosecuting Errant ‘Corporate Culture’ 
 
Rather than a conclusion that the CMCHA 2007 is ineffective as a method of structuring a 
charge of corporate manslaughter, this paper will argue that elements of the United 
Kingdom’s offence have merit and warrant adoption or, at the very least, consideration 
should New Zealand ever resolve to legislate for corporate manslaughter. Of particular note 
is its scope to evaluate “the way the organisation’s activities were managed or carried out.”87  
This element of the offence speaks to a concern with prosecuting a ‘corporate culture’ where, 
rather than assessing a corporation in terms of the acts of the individuals within it, the focus 
would turn to the corporation aggregate, inviting an assessment of the internal policies and 
processes of the company, as well as the internal views as to the importance of such 
structures. The virtues, or otherwise, of this model of liability were not canvassed in the 
Taskforce’s report. 
 
Expressions of support for attributing liability on this basis abound in academic literature, 
where authors have argued that “responsibility…can be found in the corporations structures 
themselves.”88 LH Leigh was of the view that the imputation of corporate liability “should 
depend not upon the status of the actor performing it, but on whether the crime represents a 
policy decision on the part of those in control of the corporation.”89 This concentration of 
matters of policy and process has led some to conclude that a culture based method of 
attribution might provide one method by which we can calibrate a corporate body’s intent. 
They submit that these components of culture would give “evidence of corporate aims, 
                                               
87 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, s 1(3). 
88 Wells, above n 17, at 157. 
89 LH Leigh, above n 10, at 126.  
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intentions and knowledge of individuals within the corporation,” and such would be 
authoritative “because they have emerged from the decision making process recognised as 
authoritative within the corporate culture.”90  
 
A first principles assessment has led the author to the view that Sheen J struck at the heart of 
the harms that a corporate manslaughter charge should address when he lambasted the P&O 
Ferries Corporation for their affliction with the “disease of sloppiness.”91 Arguably, a culture-
based model of liability is best placed to identify a truly blameworthy corporation in line with 
this fundamental notion. 
 
This argument speaks to a wider discord articulated by Colvin between “nominalist” and 
“realist” theories of the corporate body. Where “nominalist theories view organizations as 
nothing more than collectivities of individuals… realist theories, on the other hand, assert that 
organizations have an existence that is, to some extent, independent of the existences of their 
members.”92 The Taskforce’s recommendations, particularly aggregation, in truth fall prey to 
a nominalist conception of organizational personality that do not differ in any practical 
respect from the current identification doctrine. The extension of liability to a greater range of 
officers, while aimed to capture the entirety of activity within the corporation, would only 
give a realistic picture in the circumstance of officers from a range of levels within the 
corporation being at fault. Short of an affirmation of a corporate culture model, this would 
not prevent the same focus on the acts of individuals.  
  
Parallel jurisdictions have embraced corporate culture as a doctrine of attribution. The 
Australian Criminal Code, in providing for corporate culture as a means of proving fault, 
defines the term as an “attitude, policy, rule, course of conduct or practice existing within the 
body corporate.”93 However, as the major criminal offences lie within the legislative territory 
of states, the potential benefits of such an amendment have not borne fruit. The ACT was 
compelled to adopt this more holistic approach to corporate liability, although other states 
have not followed suit. The only example of an offence of this nature within Australia, the 
Territory adopted a corporate manslaughter offence, termed ‘Industrial Manslaughter,’ to be 
                                               
90 S Field and N Jorg, “Corporate Manslaughter and Liability: Should we be Going Dutch?” (1991) Crim LR 
156 at 159. 
91 Sheen J, above n 33. 
92 Colvin and Anand, above n 63, at 123.  
93 Criminal Code Act 1995 (Aus), s 12.3(6). 
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found in sections 49A-49E of the Crimes Act 1900 (ACT). 94 The offence provides that an 
employer or senior officer of an employer (this may be an individual or a company) is guilty 
of an offence where its reckless or negligent conduct results in the death of an employee. 
More significantly, the general principles of corporate liability espoused in the Territory’s 
Criminal Code 2002 allow for the attribution of fault if the corporation is found to have 
authorized or permitted the commission of the offence. Such can be established by: 95 
“(c)  proving that a corporate culture existed within the corporation that directed, encouraged, 
tolerated or led to noncompliance with the contravened law; or  
(d)  proving that the corporation failed to create and maintain a corporate culture requiring 
compliance with the contravened law.”  
A constraint on any analysis of these ‘corporate culture’ provisions is evident in that 
examples of the model’s application in the ACT are extremely unlikely given the territory’s 
small size and its workforce being largely composed of bureaucracy.96 Without substantial 
business and industrial sectors, the potential reach of the territory’s model remains unclear 
and untested. Furthermore, the evidential difficulties of pinpointing a corporation’s culture 
has been a point of criticism amongst scholars, as is the question of whether the corporation 
aggregate, or merely one offending section of the company, must have an errant culture in 
order to warrant criminal sanction.97 
While the term ‘corporate culture’ might appear malleable and prone to ambiguity, links to 
the upper levels of a corporation’s management persist under the commonwealth code. 
Questions of whether “authority” to perform the proscribed acts had been given, or was 
believed on reasonable grounds to have been given, by a senior manager are “relevant 
considerations” as to whether or not such a culture exists.98  
Lessons from the industrial disasters in New Zealand that have been the catalyst for the very 
occurrence of this debate seem to suggest that the health and safety culture of the companies 
                                               
94 Crimes Act (ACT), ss 49A-E. Note, however, that the ACT offence relates only to deaths that occur within 
the workplace. 
95 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT), s 51(2)(c)-(d). 
96 Des Taylor and Geraldine McKenzie “Staying focused on the big picture: should Australia legislate for 
corporate manslaughter based on the UK model?” (2013) 37 CLJ 99, at 11. 
97 Allens Arthur Robinson, “’Corporate Culture’ as a basis for the criminal liability of corporations” (prepared 
for the United Nations Representative of the Secretary-General on Human and Business, February 2008) at 17. 
98 Criminal Code (ACT), s 51(4). 
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in question was highly relevant to the eventual tragedies. Inquiries into the Pike River 
disaster identified that the “organizational culture” of the company put production before 
safety, and a criticism levelled at senior management of the organisation was that they 
“pressed ahead when health and safety systems and risk assessment processes were 
inadequate.”99 This was characterised as a systemic shortfall and a ‘cultural influence’ of 
management, which permeated the organisation as a whole.100 This would seem to confirm 
that there is a valid need to amend the organisational culture of companies so as to improve 
our health and safety record, and supports the case that it is the acts of the over-arching 
entity, rather than one or a combination of individuals within it, that should principally be at 
issue in the context of a corporate manslaughter offence. 
Having established that there is an apparent need for considerations of corporate culture 
within a corporate manslaughter offence, the question is whether this necessitates a separate 
statutory offence channelling these concerns, such as in the UK. This would seem to turn on 
the issue of whether the prosecution of corporate culture might not be properly confronted by 
a mere extension of the general law of manslaughter to corporations. Alternatively, the 
prosecution of errant corporate cultures could be introduced supplementary to reform of the 
general rules of corporate criminal attribution, alongside the extension of the net of liable 
officers and aggregation.    
 
V Alternative Reform Options  
A Collateral individual liability 
Section 1 of the CMCHA makes clear that only an organisation101 can be liable for corporate 
manslaughter.102 An individual cannot be liable for the offence, nor can they be tried as a 
secondary party.103 Academics have voiced concern around this measure, arguing that, if they 
are sufficiently culpable, individual directors should also be made accountable on a separate 
basis for the outcome of the corporation’s failings.104 This is pertinent if reforms move the 
                                               
99 Royal Commission on the Pike River Coal Mine Tragedy, above n 54, at 56. 
100 Ibid, at 175.  
101 Organisations for the purposes of the CMCHA include Corporations (s 1(2)(a)), Government departments or 
other public bodies (s 1(2)(b)), a Police Force (s 1(2)(c)), or a partnership, trade union or employers’ 
association, that is an employer (s 1(2)(d)). 
102 Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Act, s 1. 
103 s 18. 
104 Taylor and McKenzie, above n 96, at 114. 
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basis of corporate manslaughter away from the identification doctrine, where the locus of 
liability will no longer be an individually culpable “directing mind.” Reform of our health 
and safety laws indicate that this issue would not arise, as the creation of positive duties on 
directors to minimise Health and Safety risks in the current Bill were mooted in advice to the 
Taskforce as “not mutually exclusive” to a corporate manslaughter enactment and able to be 
enforced in combination.105 This parallel prosecution would ensure that all culpable parties 
are punished, while reflecting that these two notions of liability are, and should be, grounded 
on categorically distinct principles.  
B Constructive liability 
 
One of the options under consideration when the Law Commission reported on corporate 
manslaughter in the United Kingdom was a form of constructive liability, whereby guilt for 
manslaughter would arise wherever a death occurred as a result of a breach of a health and 
safety offence. Such an approach was rejected, although committing a health and safety 
offence was imported as a relevant jury consideration regarding whether a “gross breach” of 
the duty under the Act occurred.106 This model is closely analogous to the conventional 
‘unlawful act’ permutation of the general law of manslaughter currently in place in New 
Zealand.  
 
There is an arguable case for this approach to liability. The Health and Safety in Employment 
Act imposes wider duties on employers “to ensure that no action or inaction of any employee 
while at work harms any other person,”107 making the scope of the duties owed under it 
applicable to any eventuation of a homicide at the hands of a corporation. The UK’s 
hesitance to accommodate constructive manslaughter perhaps stems from the Law 
Commission’s publication of disapproval with this type of liability throughout the eneral 
criminal law.108 The same concerns do not appear to be present in New Zealand, so in the 
absence of any apparent advantages to one variation over another, consideration might also 
be lent to an enactment of this kind. 
 
                                               
105 Ministry of Business, Innovation and Employment “Supporting Material for MBIE’s presentation to the 
Independent Taskforce on Workplace Health and Safety” (27 November 2012) at 22 (Obtained under Official 
Information Act 1982 Request to the Minister of Labour). 
106David Ormerod, above n 77, at [15.4.2.2]. 
107 Health and Safety of Employment Act 1992, s 15. 
108 Law Commission (UK), above n 35, at [5.14]. 
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VI  Conclusion 
 
It is clear that, aside from the continued prevalence of great harms at the hands of 
corporations in our society, the development of criminal sanctions on the part of many of our 
most comparable foreign jurisdictions warrants serious consideration of the need for an 
offence of corporate manslaughter. Given that the Taskforce additionally recognised the 
offence as desirable for New Zealand, this divergence from the commonwealth norm cannot, 
in the long term, be maintained. 
 
The final recommendations reached by the Taskforce, namely that widespread general 
change to the common law rules of attribution was required, concurs with the weight of 
commonwealth thinking both in academic and legislative circles and was undoubtedly the 
correct conclusion. However, because the law in this area internationally is still in a state of 
infancy, it would be premature to take the Taskforce’s recommendations as an exhaustive 
statement of the options available in New Zealand. Indeed, their report was not intended to be 
so.  
 
If our elected representatives deem it appropriate for corporate manslaughter to be introduced 
into our legal system, the author is of the view that consideration should be given to a fuller 
range of options for law reform. Any eventual reforms should not take a patchwork quilt 
approach, but consider afresh the underlying principles of corporate criminal liability. This 
will only come as a result of a longer conversation, not by enacting a stand-alone law of 
corporate manslaughter while leaving the bulk of our criminal law subject to its historical 
underpinnings of individual liability. Reform of corporate criminal liability principles should 
only come from the acceptance of a realist view that an organization can have an existence, 
indeed “soul,” independent of the individuals within it.  
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